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Art authentication boards are powerful; their determina-
tions of authenticity can render artwork worthless or add 
millions of dollars to market value. In the past, boards that 
denied authenticity of artwork typically risked tort liability 
for disparagement, defamation, or fraud. In Simon-Whelan v. 
Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc., however, 
an art collector alleged monopolization and market restraint 
after an authentication board denied the authenticity of his 
Andy Warhol painting by stamping “DENIED” on the back of 
it. The case is the first antitrust lawsuit against an authen-
tication board to survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss. 
The decision therefore suggests potential liability exposure 
under the Sherman Antitrust Act for art professionals who 
render opinions on the authenticity of artwork. This Article 
discusses how Simon-Whelan provides a framework for 
pleading antitrust claims against authentication boards and 
considers what standard could be appropriate for analyzing 
similar claims at trial. This Article also describes how 
antitrust law governing standards setting and product 
certification outside the art world could apply to art authen-
tication and organizations setting authenticity standards. 
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In 1962, Andy Warhol began mass-producing silkscreened prints 
of Coke bottles, soup cans, and movie stars.1 Warhol produced this 
art in his studio, known as The Factory, in much the same way 
corporations mass-produced consumer goods.2 The line between 
business and art soon blurred for Warhol: “Business art is the step 
                                                                                                             
1 Robert Hughes, The Rise of Andy Warhol, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 18, 1982 
at 6. 
2 The Factory, WIKIPEDIA (Jan. 22, 2011, 1:48 PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/w/ 
index.php?title=The_Factory&oldid=409360588. 
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that comes after Art. I started as a commercial artist, and I want to 
finish as a business artist.”3 Warhol reached his goal: In 2007, the art 
collection of the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. 
approached $500 million.4 But with business-style success came 
business-style litigation.  
In 2007, art collector Joe Simon-Whelan filed the first antitrust 
lawsuit against the Andy Warhol Art Authentication Board, Inc. 
(“Board”), a non-profit organization that renders opinions about 
whether Warhol paintings are authentic or not.5 Simon-Whelan had 
submitted his $195,000 painting for authentication, but the Board 
stamped “DENIED” on the back of the painting, rendering the work 
of art worthless.6 Simon-Whelan documented the painting’s prove-
nance and resubmitted it for authentication, but the Board again 
stamped “DENIED” on his painting.  
In response, Simon-Whelan sued the Board and the Andy Warhol 
Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. (“Foundation”) in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.7 He 
                                                                                                             
3 ANDY WARHOL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANDY WARHOL (FROM A TO B AND 
BACK AGAIN) 92 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1st ed. 1975).  
4 Richard Dorment, What is an Andy Warhol?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 22, 
2009, at 17, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/oct/ 22/ 
what-is-an-andy-warhol/. The Foundation was formed in 1987 shortly after 
Warhol’s death, pursuant to his will, and received hundreds of millions of dollars of 
Warhol’s artwork from his estate in 1991.  
5 Amended Class Action Complaint at 4-13, Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol 
Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177 
(S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009), 2007 WL 4825571; Defendants’ Memorandum of Law 
in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at 14, Simon-Whelan v. 
Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 6423(LTS), 2009 WL 
1457177 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009), 2008 WL 877019. 
6 Id. Simon-Whelan’s Web site contains a detailed chronology of these events. 
Joe Simon-Whelan, My Story, MY ANDY WARHOL, http://www.myandywarhol.eu/ 
my/my_story.asp (last updated Feb. 25, 2010). In 2006, the BBC also produced an 
interesting documentary about the events leading up to the litigation. Imagine . . . 
Andy Warhol: Denied (BBC television broadcast Jan. 24, 2006), available at Andy 
Warhol Art Authentication, YOUTUBE (July 7, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=mA1NBGtIlHE.  
7 Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 
2009), available at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=467837269032 
7755692&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholar. 
3
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claimed the Foundation and the Board violated section 1 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sherman Act”),8 which prohibits conspira-
cies in restraint of trade; and section 2, prohibiting monopolization.9 
In particular, he alleged the Board restricted the market for authentic 
Warhols to drive up the value of the Foundation’s own art collec-
tion.10 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state 
a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.11 But the court denied this motion and allowed plaintiff’s 
monopolization and market restraint claims to proceed based on the 
Board’s rejection of the painting as an authentic Warhol.12 Although 
the lawsuit was eventually dismissed with prejudice,13 the court’s 
decision provides useful analysis of what elements need to be alleged 
under the pleading standard articulated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly14 to survive a motion to 
dismiss and proceed to discovery. 
This Article will explain how Simon-Whelan alleged sufficient 
facts to survive the Board’s motion to dismiss, will describe the 
analysis courts use to evaluate antitrust allegations, and will discuss 
how antitrust cases involving certification and standards setting 
outside the art world could contribute to an emerging antitrust theory 
                                                                                                             
8 Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  
9 Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
10 Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *1, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 26, 2009), available at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case= 4678372 
690327755692&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholar. 
11 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see also Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at 14, Simon-Whelan v. Andy 
Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 6423(LTS), 2009 WL 
1457177 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009), 2008 WL 877019. 
12 Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *8, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 26, 2009). 
13 Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009), complaint dismissed per 
stipulation, No. 07 Civ. 6423(LTS)(AJP) (Nov. 30, 2010); Press Release, The Andy 
Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Warhol Foundation Case Dismissed By 
U.S. Court (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.warholfoundation.org/foundation/ 32_ 
detail.html?page=1. 
14 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
4
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and also suggest best practices to reduce exposure to liability. 
 
I. ART MARKET AND AUTHENTICATION PRINCIPLES 
 
Contemporary art is bought and sold on two basic markets: the 
primary market for newly-created work of living artists; and the 
secondary market for work that has already been sold on the primary 
market.15 Secondary art market sales generally occur through 
auctions and private-dealer sales where prices are often much higher 
than in primary markets.16 The primary market involves curated 
gallery exhibitions of work obtained directly from artists’ studios. 
The supply side of both markets includes individual collectors, 
private owners, museums, foundations, and dealers holding inven-
tories, while the demand side includes collectors, museums, and 
dealers seeking inventory. Intermediary dealers, galleries, and auction 
houses bring these buyers and sellers together on the primary and 
secondary art markets.  
Authentication supports the secondary art market by stamping out 
forgery and misrepresentation and providing a measure of certainty in 
the secondary market.17 “[Stylistic] authentication is the process by 
which art experts—academic or independent art historians, museum 
or collection curators, art dealers, auction house experts—attribute a 
work of visual art . . . to a particular artist.”18 Opinions about authen-
ticity can change and various experts may have competing views on 
the authenticity of a particular work of art.  
Stylistic authentication methods vary, but often include: connoi-
sseurship, in which the expert expresses observations in words; 
                                                                                                             
15 New or Secondhand: The Ins and Outs of Primary and Secondary Markets, 
ECONOMIST (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/14941173. 
16 Auction prices of art sold on the secondary market can be tracked through 
various online services. E.g., Most Frequently Asked Questions About the Fine Art 
and Design Price Database, ARTNET, http://www.artnet.com/products/ pdb_faq. 
asp?H=1 (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).  
17 Sam Sachs II, Introduction: Right or Wrong, Real or Fake: Who Cares?, 8 
IFAR J. 6 (2006), http://www.ifar.org/publication_detail.php?docid=1210707503.  
18 Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Found., 890 N.Y.S.2d 16, 23 (N.Y. 
App. Div. Dec. 1, 2009) (citing Ronald D. Spencer, Introduction to THE EXPERT 
VERSUS THE OBJECT: JUDGING FAKES AND FALSE ATTRIBUTIONS IN THE VISUAL 
ARTS xi (Ronald D. Spencer ed., 2004)), appeal denied, 15 N.Y.3d 703 (2010).  
5
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reviewing the catalogue raisonné, an annotated book of the artist’s 
works; documenting provenance; and gathering eyewitness testi-
mony.19 Authentication based solely on stylistic inquiry is inherently 
subjective and therefore exposes the expert to potential liability.20 
Another approach is scientific authentication in which the expert 
conducts objective investigation based on tests including radiocarbon 
dating, chemical analysis, or x-ray diffraction.21 
Authentication of certain artwork, such as Warhol or Rembrandt, 
can be particularly challenging when the artist was prolific and 
employed assistants. Auction houses face considerable liability regar-
ding the authenticity of artwork sold on secondary markets and will 
often refuse to sell work excluded from an artist’s catalogue rai-
sonné. In other words, authentication is as much a product of market 
consensus as expert or scholarly inquiry. 
If a work of art is not listed in a catalogue raisonné, secondary 
market actors may, however, turn to authentication boards.22 Authen-
tication boards are often created by artists’ foundations and comp-
rised of individuals who have scholarly interest in an artist’s work or 
first-hand experience working with the artist. Unlike a catalogue 
raisonné, an authentication board only reviews artwork as it is 
submitted by owners. In addition, the catalogue raisonné is often 
attributed to a single author, while an authentication board is a 
committee.  
Some authentication boards have been short-lived, which can 
make secondary market actors cautious about their opinions. For 
                                                                                                             
19 Steven M. Levy, Authentication and Appraisal of Artwork, in ART LAW 
HANDBOOK 829 (Roy S. Kaufman ed., 2000); Samuel Butt, Authenticity Disputes in 
the Art World: Why Courts Should Plead Incompetence, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
71, 73-74 (2004). 
20 Steven M. Levy, Liability of the Art Expert for Professional Malpractice, 
1991 WIS. L. REV. 595, 596 (1991). 
21 LEONARD D. DUBOFF, ET AL., THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW 22-41 (2d ed. 
1993). Scientific and stylistic authentication methods are not mutually exclusive, 
but rather can be used together to make even more reliable determinations.  
22 Examples of authentication boards include: Roy Lichtenstein Authentication 
Committee, Calder Foundation, The Moholy-Nagy Foundation, The Keith Haring 
Foundation, and The Pollack-Krasner Authentication Board (disbanded). Jack 
Cowart, A Listing of Some Deceased Visual Artists’ Foundations Filing 990 PFS 
(Jan. 19, 2008) (on file with author), http://sharpeartfdn.qwestoffice.net/supple 
ment/D-3_A-Listing-of-Some-Deceased-Visual-Artists.pdf.  
6
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example, the Comite Picasso, a group of experts and members of 
Pablo Picasso’s family, formed to make definitive assessments of 
Picasso artwork, but broke up after Picasso’s daughter refused to 
participate. The Andy Warhol Art Authentication Board, Inc. was 
formed in 1995.23 
 
II. HOW SIMON-WHELAN’S LAWSUIT SURVIVED THE BOARD’S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
 
Before Simon-Whelan, plaintiffs typically alleged tort theories 
such as defamation, disparagement, or fraud against those who denied 
the authenticity of submitted artwork.24 Only one of the six major art-
law treatises even mentions an antitrust cause of action.25 Until 
Simon-Whelan, no plaintiff who had attempted an antitrust claim 
against an authentication board had ever survived the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss.26  
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only require that a 
complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief,”27 the plaintiff in Simon-Whelan 
had additional hurdles at the pleading stage under Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly: 
                                                                                                             
23 Key members of the Board have included: Gary Garrels, Judith Goldman, 
Christoph Heinrich, Jed Johnson, Sally King-Nero, Neil Printz, Robert Rosenblum, 
and David Whitney.  
24 See, e.g., McNally v. Yarnall, 764 F. Supp. 838, 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(defamation); Hahn v. Duveen, 234 N.Y.S. 185, 187 (Sup. Ct. 1929) (disparage-
ment); Goldman v. Barnett, 793 F. Supp. 28 (D. Mass 1992) (fraud). See generally 
Ronald D. Spencer, The Risk of Legal Liability for Attributions of Visual Art, in 
THE EXPERT VERSUS THE OBJECT: JUDGING FAKES AND FALSE ATTRIBUTIONS IN 
THE VISUAL ARTS 144 (Ronald D. Spencer, ed., 2004).  
25 RALPH E. LERNER, ET AL., ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, 
INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 624 (3d ed. 2005). At press time, art-law expert 
Leonard D. DuBoff has said future editions of LEONARD D. DUBOFF, ET AL., THE 
DESKBOOK OF ART LAW (2d. ed. 1993) and LEONARD D. DUBOFF & CHRISTY O. 
KING, ART LAW IN A NUTSHELL (4th ed. 2004) will contain discussions of the issues 
raised in this Article. 
26 See, e.g., Vitale v. Marlborough Gallery, No. 93 Civ. (PKL) 6276, 1994 WL 
654494 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 1994); Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Found., 850 F. Supp. 
250 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
7
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[S]tating such a claim requires a complaint with 
enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that 
an agreement was made. Asking for plausible grounds 
to infer an agreement does not impose a probability 
requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for 
enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”28 
Antitrust litigation is tremendously complex and therefore factual 
allegations in the complaint must be pled with sufficient specificity to 
justify dragging the defendant through discovery.29 The Board moved 
to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on grounds it did not meet Twombly’s 
pleading requirements. But Simon-Whelan found the complaint did 
meet Twombly’s requirements by alleging (A) “sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
its face[]’” which (B) occurred within a “relevant market” and (C) 
caused antitrust injury.30 As a result, discovery was allowed to 
proceed. The litigation ultimately cost defendants nearly $7 million in 
legal fees before the case was dismissed with prejudice.31 
 
A.  Plausibility 
 
Plaintiff alleged Sherman Act section 1 (“Section 1”) violations 
involving collusion between the Foundation that sold Warhol artwork 
and the Board that authenticated Warhol artwork. Plaintiff also 
                                                                                                             
28 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
29 Id. at 558 (“a district court must retain the power to insist upon some 
specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to 
proceed. . . .[T]he costs of modern federal antitrust litigation and the increasing 
caseload of the federal courts counsel against sending the parties into discovery 
when there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs can construct a claim from 
the events related in the complaint.”) 
30 Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *4, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 26, 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (quoting Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))).  
31 Linda Sandler, Warhol Foundation's $7 Million Defense Beats Collector’s 
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alleged Sherman Act section 2 (“Section 2”) violations including 
claims that the Foundation used the Board to remove competing 
Warhol artwork from the market to drive up the value of the 
Foundation’s art collection. The court found such allegations satisfied 
Twombly because they “raise[d] a right to relief above the speculative 
level.”32  
The court concluded Simon-Whelan’s Section 1 claim met the 
“plausibility” standard by alleging the Board (1) made unsolicited 
suggestions that Warhol owners submit their work for authentication, 
(2) reversed prior authentication determinations, (3) refused to 
authenticate works the Foundation had attempted to purchase, and (4) 
and was not independent of the Foundation.33 A recent decision from 
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Thome v. 
Alexander & Louisa Calder Foundation, has discussed how these 
allegations are now a possible framework for pleading antitrust 
complaints against parties who deny authenticity.34  
Simon-Whelan also found sufficient allegations of a Section 2 
violation.35 Section 2 complaints must allege facts “indicative of 
anticompetitive conduct with a specific intent to monopolize and a 
dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power . . .”36 It is 
notable that the court did not analyze the “specific intent to 
monopolize” element. A Section 2 complaint should allege monopoly 
power resulted from willful acquisition, not just accident or business 
acumen.37 It is possible this element was adequately met by pleading 
facts establishing plausibility, such as the Board’s alleged refusal to 
authenticate works after attempting to purchase them. Nevertheless, 
future authentication committee defendants should consider raising 
the issue of specific intent to weaken complaints after Simon-
                                                                                                             
32 Id. at 555.  
33 Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *5, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 26, 2009). 
34 890 N.Y.S.2d 16, 32 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), appeal denied, 15 N.Y.3d 703 
(2010). 
35 Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
36 Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *5, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 26, 2009). 
37 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
9
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Whelan.38 Moreover, given how much this case ultimately cost defen-
dants, courts in the future may be more vigilant about scrutinizing 
complaints before so readily allowing discovery to proceed.39 
 
B.  Relevant Market 
 
After meeting Twombly’s plausibility standard, Simon-Whelan 
also alleged the anticompetitive effects occurred within a “relevant 
market.”40 Section 1 and 2 claims both require plaintiffs to define this 
relevant market.41 The relevant market includes both a “geographic 
market,” where the defendant competes, and a “product market” with 
which the defendant’s product competes.42 (Both elements should be 
established.)43 Antitrust plaintiffs argue the relevant market is narrow, 
while defendants will downplay their market share by arguing their 
products fit within a broader market.44 Although products like 
artwork exist within a broad market, distinct submarkets can also 
constitute distinct products.45 
Two key decisions discussed in Simon-Whelan helped establish 
there is a relevant submarket for Warhol artwork within the market 
for modern and contemporary art. First, Simon-Whelan relied on 
                                                                                                             
38 See infra text accompanying notes 95-97.  
39 Cf. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations 
omitted) (“For complaints involving complex litigation—for example, antitrust or 
RICO claims—a fuller set of factual allegations may be necessary to show that 
relief is plausible.”); Kirihara v. Bendix Corp., 306 F.Supp. 72, 76 (1969) (“This 
court believes that in potentially complex cases, particularly in cases involving 
violations of the antitrust laws, the plaintiff should go beyond the ‘short’ 
requirements of Rule 8 if necessary to present a ‘plain’, i.e., understandable and 
factual statement of the alleged antitrust violations.”) 
40 See, e.g., Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-72; United States v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380 (1956).  
41 Adam J. Biegel, et al., Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, in 
ANTITRUST ADVISER § 10.23, at 10-71 (Irving Scher ed., 4th ed. 2009). 
42 1 Irving Scher, Horizontal Restraints and Monopolization, in ANTITRUST 
ADVISER § 1.22, at 1-63 (Irving Scher ed., 4th ed. 2009). 
43 See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993). 
44 Compare Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 
481-82 (1992) (finding a relevant market for a single brand of replacement parts) 
with Elliot v. United Ctr., 126 F.3d 1003, 1005 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting allegation 
of a relevant market for food sales within a single sports arena). 
45 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).  
10
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dictum in Vitale v. Marlborough Gallery to find a relevant market for 
famous works within the modern and contemporary art market.46 In 
Vitale, the court had noted that “paintings by Jackson Pollock may 
constitute a submarket, the monopolization of which may be 
unlawful . . .” under the Sherman Act because such paintings lacked a 
practical substitute.47 Second, the court relied on Kramer v. Pollock-
Krasner Foundation to find a narrowly defined submarket for famous 
artwork can be a relevant market sufficient to state a claim.48  
Although the court correctly stated “relevant market” contains 
two elements—product market and geographic market—it may have 
conflated the analysis. In particular, Simon-Whelan found the 
“distinct submarket . . . of Andy Warhol works within the modern 
and contemporary art market” was a sufficient “relevant geographic 
product market.”49 Again, product market concerns whether defen-
dant’s product can be substituted,50 while geographic market 
concerns the region of “effective competition.”51 While future 
antitrust plaintiffs can safely assert the existence of a “relevant 
submarket” for famous paintings, they should still carefully evaluate 
both elements of the relevant market. Indeed much of the contem-
porary art market is concentrated in New York City, but it is also an 
international market. A clearly defined relevant market helps courts 
identify the area of economic activity and whether defendant has 
exercised sufficient market power in that relevant market to constitute 
a violation.  
Another problem with the court’s definition of the relevant 
                                                                                                             
46 Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *6, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 26, 2009) (citing Vitale v. Marlborough Gallery, 1994 WL 654494, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. July 5, 1994)).  
47 Vitale v. Marlborough Gallery, No. 93 Civ. (PKL) 6276, 1994 WL 654494, 
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 1994).  
48 Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *6, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 26, 2009) (citing Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Found., 890 F. Supp. 250, 254 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995)). 
49 Id. (emphasis added).  
50 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 
481-482 (1992). 
51 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1966). 
11
Lacy: Standardizing Warhol: Antitrust Liability for Denying the Authent
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2011
196 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 6:3 
market is that it seems to overlook the possibility that other 
contemporary artwork could substitute for Warhol work in the 
secondary market. While some collectors might prefer Warhol, this 
does not necessarily create a submarket for Warhol artwork. By 
analogy, consumers might prefer particular automobile manufac-
turers, but this does not necessarily create separate relevant markets 
for Hondas and Toyotas. In sum, the court’s finding—that there is a 
relevant submarket for Warhol work—seems to exclude artwork from 
other contemporary artists that are potential economic substitutes for 
Warhol artwork. 
 
C.  Antitrust Injury 
 
After establishing plausibility and relevant market, Simon-
Whelan alleged an “antitrust injury.”52 He argued the Board action 
caused an injury that “reflect[s] the anticompetitive effect either of 
the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the 
violation.”53 Simon-Whelan alleged the Board’s practice of stamping 
“DENIED” on his artwork prevented him from participating as a 
seller in the market for authentic Warhol art.54 The court affirmed the 
Board’s practice of stamping “DENIED” on artwork, deeming it “not 
authentic,” was a sufficient antitrust injury: “the double-stamping of 
‘Denied’ on his artwork in furtherance of the alleged antitrust 
conspiracy has prevented him from competing as a seller in the 
lucrative market for authentic Warhols . . .”55  
One unresolved issue is what type of market restraint occurs when 
an art authentication committee prevents a seller from marketing his 
or her own artwork. The first possibility is that such practices are 
nonprice vertical restraints in which the committee is analogous to a 
                                                                                                             
52 Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *6, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 26, 2009). 
53 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
54 Amended Class Action Complaint at 4-13, Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol 
Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177 
(S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009), 2007 WL 4825571 
55 Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *6, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 26, 2009)  
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producer dictating terms of sale to dealers.56 A second possibility is 
that authentication is a nonprice horizontal restraint in which various 
dealers conspire to shut out a particular dealer—a practice that would 
be per se illegal.57 A plaintiff’s ability to uncover unlawful horizontal 
market restraints often requires discovery, which is why surviving a 
motion to dismiss was significant in Simon-Whelan.58 
 
III. TWO LITIGATION PATHS: PER SE ILLEGAL OR RULE OF REASON 
ANALYSIS 
 
Surviving a motion to dismiss is just the beginning. Next, a 
successful antitrust plaintiff must either prove defendant’s actions 
were so blatantly anticompetitive as to be “per se illegal” or the 
negative anticompetitive effects of such actions outweighed any pro-
competitive market effect. Whether a practice is per se illegal or 
analyzed under the more flexible—and defendant-friendly—“rule of 
reason” is a matter of law.59 This section describes how courts might 
determine whether the per se or rule of reason analysis applies to an 
art authentication activity. 
 
A.  Categorizing Market Restraints 
 
Some business practices are considered unreasonable by their 
very nature and therefore per se unlawful under the Sherman Act. 
Unlawful Section 1 activities include agreements to fix prices, 
boycott competitors, or limit production and control markets. To 
determine whether a practice is per se illegal, courts will: (1) distin-
guish between vertical and horizontal market restraints, (2) consider 
the effect on both interbrand and intrabrand competition, and (3) may 
analyze price and nonprice restraints differently. Antitrust cases often 
                                                                                                             
56 See Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977); 
see infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. 
57 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 
(1961). 
58 All discovery is stayed pending resolution of a motion to dismiss an antitrust 
cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).  
59 Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 363 F.3d 761, 772 (8th Cir. 
2004).  
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turn on how courts categorize a particular business practice.60  
First, courts determine whether a business practice is a vertical or 
horizontal market restraint.61 A vertical restraint occurs when busi-
nesses at different levels of competition collude in the same market, 
while a horizontal restraint is an agreement between businesses at the 
same level of competition. For example, an agreement between a 
producer and dealer not to supply to other dealers could be a vertical 
restraint.62 Collusion between dealers to fix prices would be a hori-
zontal restraint. Vertical restraints are often subject to rule of reason 
analysis; horizontal restraints are more likely to be per se illegal.63  
The distinction between vertical and horizontal restraints blurs in 
a “dual distribution” system in which a producer also competes with 
dealers that sell the producer’s products.64 For example, an artist or 
an art collector might sell paintings directly to the public and also 
through particular private dealers. In most cases, the rule of reason 
applies to such dual distribution systems.65 But if there is evidence of 
a horizontal conspiracy to limit sales to particular dealers—even if a 
dealer arranged the conspiracy—that would be per se illegal.66 Dual 
distribution could involve a vertical group boycott (per se illegal) or a 
                                                                                                             
60 Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust 
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1210 (2008). 
61 See A-Abart Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 956 F.2d 1399, 1402-
03 (7th Cir. 1992) (vertical restraints are analyzed under rule of reason unless they 
involve price fixing). 
62 See Yeager’s Fuel, Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 953 F. Supp. 617, 654 
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (forcing contractors to install only electric heating was a vertical 
restraint because the power company and developers were at different distribution 
levels).  
63 See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1998) (antitrust 
law does not apply per se rule to vertical boycotts unless there is also horizontal 
agreement or price fixing); Crane & Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 
F.2d 802, 805 (6th Cir. 1988).  
64 Lemley, supra note 60, at 1235-41. 
65 See AT&T Corp. v. JMC Telecom, LLC, 470 F.3d 525, 531 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(although vertical relationship had horizontal elements, per se analysis was 
inappropriate for dual distributorship arrangements). 
66 E.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 934-36 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(finding evidence that dominant toy dealer coordinated a horizontal conspiracy 
among manufacturers to limit their sales to certain dealers); accord NYNEX Corp., 
525 U.S. at 133-37 (single dealer’s decision to buy from one producer was a 
vertical agreement not subject to per se rule against horizontal group boycotts). 
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unilateral refusal to deal (likely to be lawful under rule of reason 
analysis).  
Second, courts always consider the effects of a business practice 
on both interbrand and intrabrand competition. Interbrand competi-
tion means competition between businesses with developed brands or 
labels; intrabrand competition, in contrast, means horizontal com-
petition between distributors of the same product.67 Some art 
authentication services arguably reduce interbrand competition by 
suppressing the market for products deemed “not authentic.” Another 
possibility is that art dealers reduce interbrand competition between 
various authentication services by refusing to acknowledge the 
opinions of certain types of authentication experts. Antitrust law is 
mostly concerned with protecting interbrand competition; practices 
that restrain interbrand competition are more likely per se unlawful.68  
Courts have upheld exclusive dealership plans when such 
decisions had only slight effects on intrabrand competition and a high 
level of interbrand competition already existed.69 This suggests that if 
a producer took action to shut down all sales of artwork outside 
authorized channels that could arguably be an unlawful restriction on 
intrabrand competition of certain distribution channels.70  
Third, courts sometimes distinguish between price restraints and 
nonprice restraints such as prohibiting sales outside designated 
geographic areas or limiting sales to particular classes of customers.71 
                                                                                                             
67 Competition between Coca-Cola and Pepsi is an example of interbrand 
competition. Competition between department stores and discount outlets selling 
the same products is an example of intrabrand competition.  
68 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-52 n. 19 (1977) 
describes this principle: “[W]hen interbrand competition exists, as it does among 
television manufacturers, it provides a significant check on the exploitation of 
intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a 
different brand of the same product.”  
69 E.g., Elecs. Commc’ns. Corp. v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods., Inc., 129 
F.3d 240, 244-45 (2d Cir. 1997). 
70 Cf. Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068, 1075-76 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(territorial restrictions imposed by producer upon distributors were unreasonable 
when restrictions eliminated intrabrand competition within each distributor’s 
territory); Graphic Prods. Dist., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1577-78 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (benefits to interbrand competition did not outweigh the significant 
burden on intrabrand competition).  
71 E.g., Beach v. Viking Sewing Mach. Co., 784 F.2d 746, 750-51 (6th Cir. 
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After Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., the rule 
of reason applies to both price and nonprice vertical restraints.72 
Nevertheless, courts might still view price restraints with more 
caution and scrutinize vertical price restraints for related unlawful 
horizontal price restraints. 
 
B.  Per Se Antitrust Violations 
 
Standards setting and certification activities outside the art world 
are usually subject to the defendant-friendly rule of reason analysis.73 
Nevertheless, it is important to consider the potential for a per se 
violation because the consequence can be disastrous for an antitrust 
defendant: If plaintiff establishes a per se violation, defendant will be 
barred from attempting to offer procompetitive justifications for why 
the restraint was reasonable.74 The penalty for an antitrust violation is 
treble damages and the cost of suit, including attorney’s fees.75 
A per se Section 1 Sherman Act violation requires plaintiff to 
prove: two or more entities engaged in a conspiracy, combination, or 
contract;76 to effect a market restraint prohibited per se;77 that proxi-
mately caused of the plaintiff’s antitrust injury.78 In general, the per 
se rule applies to boycotts and price fixing, but not to unilateral 
decisions to only buy goods from one producer.79 For example, 
Fashion Originators’ Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission held it was per se illegal for competing clothing designers 
and dealers to agree not to deal with stores that sold copied styles.80 If 
                                                                                                             
1986) (prohibitions requiring dealers to provide after-sale services were non-price 
restraints evaluated under rule of reason). 
72 551 U.S. 877, 881 (2007).  
73 Cf. 15 USC § 4302 (2006) (“a standards development organization while 
engaged in a standards development activity, shall not be deemed illegal per se; 
such conduct shall be judged on the basis of its reasonableness”). 
74 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 
(1940). 
75 Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). 
76 E.g., Guzowski v. Hartman, 969 F.2d 211, 214 (6th Cir. 1992). 
77 Dunn & Mavis, Inc. v. Nu-Car Driveaway, Inc., 691 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 
1982). 
78 Hodges v. WSM, Inc., 26 F.3d 36, 38 (6th Cir. 1994).  
79 NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998). 
80 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941). 
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competing art dealers banded together to shut out disfavored dealers, 
this could also be an unlawful horizontal restraint.  
In addition, an art producer’s actions could be unlawful if other 
dealers were involved in setting market restrictions, rather than just 
merely acceding to them.81 It could even be per se unlawful for distri-
butors to lobby a producer to impose price restraints.82 On the other 
hand, the plaintiff would have to show other dealers were actively 
setting the market restraints in concert with the producer—if dealers 
merely go along with a producer’s restrictions, that would not be 
enough.83 
In summary, the following practices are likely per se illegal: a 
vertical agreement between a producer and a dealer to fix prices; 
horizontal agreements between dealers or producers to fix prices; and 
practices that eliminate all interbrand competition for production or 
sale of particular works of art. In contrast, a nonprice vertical 
restraint—such as refusal to sell artwork from producers who have 
not obtained authentication—is likely subject to a rule of reason 
analysis. 
 
C.  Rule of Reason Analysis 
 
If a court does not find a per se antitrust violation, it will conduct 
a rule of reason analysis of the alleged market restraint.84 The 
Chicago Board of Trade Case gave the analysis its classic formu-
lation: “whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and 
                                                                                                             
81 See, e.g., Toscano v. Prof’l Golfers’ Ass’n, 258 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 
2001) (rejecting claim of conspiracy, when local golf tournament sponsors did not 
participate in negotiating terms of restraints). 
82 See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 734-36 
(1988) (agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor to terminate a 
competing price-cutting distributor could be a per se violation if the parties actually 
agree on the price to be charged). 
83 Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 617 F. Supp. 800, 808-09 (N.D. Ind. 1985), 
aff’d, 797 F.2d 1430, 1439 (7th Cir. 1986). 
84 FTC v. Indep. Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986); See generally, 
M. Howard Morse, Standard Setting and Antitrust: The Intersection Between IP 
Rights and the Antitrust Laws, IP LITIGATOR, May-June 2003, at 17, available at 
http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/publications/ (select articles from 2003; then scroll 
to June 1, 2003).  
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perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may 
suppress or even destroy competition.”85 Today, the basic rule of 
reason test is whether “anticompetitive effects outweigh . . . pro-
competitive effects.”86 This ad hoc balancing approach generally 
requires the plaintiff to prove an agreement to restrain trade exists87 
and the agreement was anticompetitive.88  
While courts differ on how to conduct the ad hoc rule of reason 
analysis, all courts focus on some of the following factors: (1) the 
severity of the restraint; (2) defendant’s market power; and (3) 
defendant’s intent.89  
First, courts weigh the severity of the market restraint. Restraints 
with “pernicious effects” will be held unlawful.90 For example, 
restraints involving price restrictions will likely be unlawful.91 
Second, courts examine whether the defendant has significant market 
power.92 Market power means dominant market share in a well-
defined product and geographic market.93 A standard measure of 
                                                                                                             
85 The Chicago Board of Trade Case, 246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918). 
86 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 (1988). In 
particular, a prima facie case requires proving: (1) the defendant contracted, 
combined, or conspired; (2) the combination or conspiracy produced adverse 
anticompetitive effects; (3) within relevant product and geographical markets; and 
(4) plaintiff was injured as a proximate result. Int’l Logistics Grp., Ltd. v. Chrysler 
Corp., 884 F.2d 904, 907 (6th Cir. 1989). 
87 E.g., St. Martin v. KFC Corp., 935 F. Supp. 898, 905-06 (W.D. Ky. 1996). 
88 E.g., Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722 (3d Cir. 1991). 
89 E.g., Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 955 F.2d 1388, 1393 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(analyzing vertical relationship under rule of reason); Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. 
Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming that 
establishing market power is a necessary element of every rule of reason case); 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436, n.13 (1978) (noting 
“the general rule [is] that a civil violation can be established by proof of either an 
unlawful purpose or an anticompetitive effect.”). 
90 E.g., Schaeffer v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 976 F. Supp. 736, 740-41 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1997). 
91 See Clairol, Inc. v. Bos. Disc. Ctr. of Berkeley, Inc., 608 F.2d 1114, 1124 
(6th Cir. 1979) (upholding vertical customer restraints when seller did not impose 
any restrictions on resale prices). 
92 E.g., Winter Hill Frozen Foods & Servs., Inc. v. Haagen-Dazs Co., 691 F. 
Supp. 539, 546-48 (D. Mass. 1988). 
93 E.g., James M. King & Ass’n., Inc. v. G.D. Van Wagenen Co., 717 F. Supp. 
667, 675 (D. Minn. 1989). 
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market power would be sales within the relevant market divided by 
total sales.94 Nevertheless, the art market’s relatively inelastic nature 
and barriers to entry may allow dealers with smaller market share to 
dominate—consumers will not necessarily turn to substitutes if prices 
increase. Third, courts frequently indicate that unlawful intent does 
not violate the rule of reason in the absence of anticompetitive 
effects.95 Intent may, however, be relevant in determining whether the 
effect of a restraint is unreasonable.96 Even a denial of authentication 
that rendered art unmarketable would not violate antitrust law unless 
there is some anticompetitive rationale, such as evidence that the 
committee who made the decision also sells artwork in the same 
relevant market.97  
Regardless of which factors a court considers, the key inquiry is 
the reasonableness of the challenged standard or certification.98 
“Reasonableness” in this context generally refers to the effect of the 
standard on competition, not to substantive reasonableness of the 
standard itself.99 
Once plaintiff shows anticompetitive effects of a market restraint, 
the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a procompetitive justi-
fication.100 Courts have accepted procompetitive justifications such as 
                                                                                                             
94 There is no magic number, but courts have rejected challenges to geographic 
restraints when producers only command 10% of the relevant market. E.g., Ryko 
Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1231-34 (8th Cir. 1987).  
95 E.g., Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Farmland Dairy Farms, Inc., 282 N.J. Super. 
140, 186 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).  
96 Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) 
(association liable for restraint of trade by misinterpreting an standard for 
association’s own purposes). 
97 Cf. DM Research, Inc. v. Coll. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 57-58 (1st 
Cir. 1999) (defendant not liable for denying certification of laboratory-grade water 
because defendant represented laboratories, rather than competing producers).  
98 See e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 
(1988); U.S. Trotting Ass’n. v. Chi. Downs Ass’n., 665 F.2d 781, 787 (7th Cir. 
1981); see generally, ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 23, THE RULE 
OF REASON 6-7 (1999). 
99 13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶¶ 2232a, 2232b, at 414 (2d ed. 
2005). 
100 E.g., Expert Masonry, Inc. v. Boone County, 440 F.3d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 
2006). 
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increased information for consumers,101 uniformity across geographic 
regions,102 and improved product quality.103 Art authenstication has 
the important procompetitive effect of suppressing forgeries and 
helping consumers select genuine artwork. The defendant must show 
this procompetitive effect cannot be achieved in a substantially less 
restrictive manner.104  
Courts will investigate proffered justifications to determine 
whether they are genuine. Sometimes courts determine a purported 
procompetitive justification is just a sham to cover for an underlying 
anticompetitive practice. For example, courts found a warranty 
regulation system was a façade for an anticompetitive vertical market 
allocation.105 Courts have examined press releases and meeting 
minutes for evidence of ulterior motives in imposing a geographic 
restraint.106 If dealers were refusing to sell artwork in an effort to 
drive up the value of their holdings—rather than to exclude forge-
ries—this would weigh against the dealers in an antitrust analysis. 
Practices could also be unlawful if solely motivated by price 
considerations, rather than assisting customers or increasing market 
efficiencies.107  
In summary, vertical nonprice restraints are likely to be upheld as 
reasonable under the “rule of reason” if the restraint promotes 
interbrand competition without overly restricting intrabrand compe-
tition.108 But vertical restraints may be struck down if they have a 
pernicious effect on interbrand competition, which will more likely 
                                                                                                             
101 E.g., Consol. Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 296 
(5th Cir. 1988). 
102 E.g., Eliason Corp. v. Nat’l Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126, 129-30 (6th 
Cir. 1980) (the standard “helps promote nationwide competition and enables 
manufacturers . . . to be reasonably sure they will not have to modify their 
product . . . .”).  
103 E.g., Mendelovitz v. Adolph Coors Co., 693 F.2d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(manufacturer has legitimate interest in taste and quality of its product). 
104 Wilk v. Am. Med. Assn., 719 F.2d 207, 227 (7th Cir. 1983); Kreuzer v. 
Am. Academy of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
105 Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068, 1076-81 (2d Cir. 1980). 
106 Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 1012-13 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
107 See Beach v. Viking Sewing Mach. Co., 784 F.2d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 1986). 
108 See, e.g., Three Movies of Tarzana v. Pac. Theatres, Inc., 828 F.2d 1395, 
1399 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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occur when there is a latent horizontal component to the restraint.109 
Courts have also struck down vertical nonprice restrictions under the 
rule of reason when a producer was not acting independent from 
distributors in imposing a market restraint.110 Again, this might occur 
when the restriction on a producer is imposed at the behest of another 
dealer.111 
 
IV. FUTURE FRAMEWORKS: APPLYING ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF 
CERTIFICATION AND STANDARDS SETTING TO ART 
AUTHENTICATION 
 
Allegations of antitrust violations may be on the rise within the 
art world so it is useful for authentication boards to consider the 
application of antitrust law as it applies to certification and standards-
setting organizations.112 This section will explain how certification 
and standards setting can raise antitrust liability and will describe 
how best practices adopted by certification and standards-setting 
bodies could apply to art authentication boards.  
An industry standard is “a document established by consensus 
and approved by a recognized body that provides for common and 
                                                                                                             
109 E.g., Carlson Mach. Tools, Inc. v. Am. Tool, Inc., 678 F.2d 1253, 1261-62 
(5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting distributor’s assertion that territorial restraints curbed 
intrabrand competition without allegations of harm to interbrand competition). 
110 See Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1569-70 
(11th Cir. 1983) (violation found under rule of reason when dual distributor-
supplier with 70% market share terminated a distributor for not complying with 
market restrictions). 
111 See, e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 934-36 (7th Cir. 2000). 
112 In January 2010 art collector Susan Shaer also sued the Andy Warhol Art 
Authentication Board for denying the authenticity of Warhol artwork. Shaer v. 
Andy Warhol Foundation For The Visual Arts, Inc., No. 2010 Civ. 00373 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 15, 2010), available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/court-
nysdce/case_no-1:2010cv00373/case_id-357265/; see generally Eileen Kinsella, 
Warhol Board Faces New Lawsuit, ZIMBIO.COM (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www. 
zimbio.com/Andy+Warhol+Art+Authentication+Board/articles/8wlxvvExOKA/ 
Warhol+Art+Authentication+Board+Faces+New. But see, Andy Warhol’s Red Self-
Portrait: An Exchange, ARTNET, (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.artnet.com/ magazine 
us/news/artnetnews/joe-simon-andy-warhol11-17-10.asp. (describing how the 
lawsuit was abandoned in November 2010).  
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repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities . . .”113 
Examples include standards for wall sockets, organic produce, and 
cellular phone frequencies. Some standards are government man-
dated, while others result from voluntary self-regulation.114 Groups 
such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) have 
promulgated thousands of industry standards to promote safety or 
quality.115 Standards are also important for facilitating commerce and 
providing valuable information to consumers.  
Once an industry standard is set, third-party certification bodies 
often assess whether products conform to the standard.116 For 
example, the Good Housekeeping “Seal of Approval” certifies that a 
product underwent testing to meet a quality standard.117 When an art 
authentication board authenticates a painting, it is, for all purposes, 
certifying that the artwork met an authenticity standard.  
Standards and certification activities by their nature restrain trade 
because they divert business from one competitor to another.118 
                                                                                                             
113 What are standards?, EUR. TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., http://www. 
etsi.org/WebSite/Standards/WhatIsAStandard.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2011); 
Maureen A. Breitenber, The ABC’s of Standards-Related Activities in the United 
States (Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., Paper No. NISTIR 7614, Aug. 2009), 
available at http://gsi.nist.gov/global/docs/pubs/NISTIR_7614.pdf. See also 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 B.C. L. 
REV. 87 (2007), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol48/iss1/4/;  
114 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STANDARDS, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT AND 
TRADE INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 11 (1995), available at http://www.nap.edu/ 
openbook.php?record_id=4921&page=R1.  
115 AM. NAT. STANDARDS. INST., About ANSI Overview, http://www.ansi.org/ 
about_ansi/overview/overview.aspx?menuid=1 (last visited January 19, 2011). 
116 Jonathan T. Howe, Leland J. Badger, The Antitrust Challenge to Non-Profit 
Certification Organizations: Conflicts of Interest and a Practical Rule of Reason 
Approach to Certification Programs as Industry-Wide Builders of Competition and 
Efficiency, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 357 (1982-1983). 
117 The History of the Good Housekeeping Seal, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, 
http://www.goodhousekeeping.com/product-testing/history/good-housekeeping-
seal-history (last visited Jan. 18, 2011). 
118 FTC, Bureau of Consumer Protection, STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION 
(FINAL STAFF REPORT) at 275-76 (1983); Harry S. Gerla, Federal Antitrust Law and 
Trade and Professional Associations Standards and Certification, 19 DAYTON L. 
REV. 471 (1994). For an excellent overview see Andrew Updegrove, Laws, Cases 
and Regulations, CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG (2007), http://www.consortiuminfo.org/ 
laws/.  
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Antitrust violations occur when standards are promulgated in an 
effort to exclude competitors from the market.119 Standards setting 
and certification practices are generally subject to the same antitrust 
analysis as any other business practice. Nonprofit entities are also 
subject to antitrust liability just like for-profit businesses.120  
Drawing on these principles, an art authentication board should 
ensure its authentication service benefits the market: “The paramount 
antitrust challenge for nonprofit product certification products is to 
demonstrate aggressively that such programs strengthen the compe-
titive market system on an industry-wide basis.”121 
 
A.  Does Per Se or Rule of Reason Apply to Standards Setting and 
Authentication? 
 
In general, the rule of reason analysis applies to standards setting: 
such activities will be upheld as long as the standard is reasonably 
necessary to achieve a procompetitive benefit.122 For example, a court 
refused to apply the per se rule to the American Kennel Club’s estab-
lishment of mandatory dog “breed” standards because uniformity was 
necessary for competition among owners and breeders.123 
Although rule of reason generally applies, some practices—such 
as group boycotts—would be blatantly anticompetitive and always 
per se antitrust violations.124 If a group of art dealers or auction 
houses coordinated to exclude a particular authentication service from 
the market for authentication services, this could arguably constitute a 
                                                                                                             
119 13 HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, ¶ 2231a, at 409. 
120 See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n. v. FTC, 526 US 756, 768-69 (1999). 
121 Howe, supra note 116, at 357. 
122 See, e.g., Cont’l Airline, Inc. v United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 
2002) (per se rule inapplicable to a standard imposed by trade association to limit 
the size of carry-on baggage). But see United States v. Nat’l Ass’n. of Broadcasters, 
536 F. Supp. 149, 160-62 (D.D.C. 1982) (television broadcasters trade association 
standard prohibiting the advertisement of more than one product in a commercial 
lasting less than 60 seconds held per se illegal). 
123 Jessup v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d 
per curiam, 210 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000).  
124 FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (competitively 
motivated horizontal group boycotts). A group boycott, also known as a refusal to 
deal, means “withholding or enlisting others to withhold patronage or services from 
the target.” St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541-43 (1978). 
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per se violation. A per se violation could also occur if an authen-
tication committee forced others to follow its recommendations.125  
In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., the 
Supreme Court found a per se illegal boycott when a powerful group 
of producers manipulated an industry standard to arbitrarily deny 
certification to a competitor’s product.126 This suggests an authen-
tication practice could also be per se illegal if the standard constituted 
a horizontal agreement among competitors not to deal with a 
particular dealer.127  
It is worth noting, however, that courts sometimes refuse to apply 
the per se rule in cases involving unique markets on the ground that 
courts lacks experience to condemn certain practices on their face.128 
For example, Vogel v. American Society of Appraisers refused to 
apply the per se rule to the practice of barring member appraisers 
from charging fixed appraisal fees.129 Commentators have similarly 
argued the art market is sufficiently complex such that courts should 
not decide issues of authenticity on a per se basis.130  
In summary, standards setting will generally be subject to rule of 
reason analysis unless the standard is a mere sham to facilitate 
exclusion. Moreover courts generally apply rule of reason analysis to 
certification decisions about particular products.131 In part, this is 
                                                                                                             
125 See Consol. Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 292 
(5th Cir. 1998); Int’l Healthcare Mgmt. v. Haw. Coal. For Health, 332 F.3d 600, 
606 (9th Cir. 2003) (no antitrust violation when professional association did not 
force anyone to follow its advice). 
126 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 
(1961). Although Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery and Printing 
Co. has since held that boycotts should be analyzed under the rule of reason, a 
restraint can be per se unlawful if plaintiff “present[s] a threshold case that the 
challenged activity falls into a category likely to have predominantly anticompe-
titive effects.” 472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985).  
127 See e.g., Pretz v. Holstein Friesian Ass’n., 698 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (D. 
Kan. 1988); Consol. Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Instit., 846 F.2d 284, 292 
(5th Cir. 1988). 
128 See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 
(1979) (refusing to apply the per se rule to issuances of blanket licensing to music).  
129 744 F.2d 598, 603-04 (7th Cir. 1984).  
130 See e.g., Samuel Butt, Authenticity Disputes in the Art World: Why Courts 
Should Plead Incompetence, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 71, 85 (2004). 
131 E.g., Eliason Corp. v. Nat’l Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126, 129-30 (6th 
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because courts do not want to condemn practices with which they 
lack sufficient expertise.132  
 
B.  Status of the Essential Facilities Doctrine 
 
When product certification is necessary for a business to compete 
in a given market, denial of certification could be a per se 
violation.133 This “essential facilities” doctrine is not really an 
independent basis for antitrust liability, but rather a type of monopo-
lization claim.134 The Supreme Court has not directly supported a 
cause of action for denial of essential facilities.135 Nevertheless, the 
concept still has applicability to standards and certification and lower 
courts continue to speak in terms of “essential facilities.”136 
Radiant Burners found a producer of gas burners properly alleged 
an antitrust claim against an industry association who refused to 
certify the company’s gas burners as safe, thereby making them 
impossible to sell.137 Denial of the association’s “seal of approval” 
raised antitrust concerns because the seal had such prestige in the 
industry that it had become mandatory in some local codes. An art 
authentication board’s opinion could raise similar issues if a work of 
                                                                                                             
Cir. 1980); Moore v. Boating Indus. Ass’ns, 819 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1987); Hatley v. 
Am. Quarter Horse Ass’n, 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977); Jessup v. Am. Kennel 
Club, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
132 E.g., Vogel v. American Society of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 
1984) (noting, “the novelty of the challenged practice (novel to the courts, that is) is 
a reason against per se classification.”). 
133 Brett M. Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential 
Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2008). 
134 Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Found., 890 F. Supp. 250, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).  
135 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398 (2004). 
136 Gregory v. Fort Bridger Rendezvous Ass’n, 448 F.3d 1195, 1204 (10th Cir. 
2006); Daisy Mountain Fire Dist. v. Microsoft Corp., 547 F. Supp. 2d 475, 490 (D. 
Md. 2008). Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, 40 F.3d 247 (7th Cir.) 
(1994) (holding American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology did not improperly 
refuse certification that was unnecessary for medical practice and did not inhibit 
competition), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996); accord George R. Whitten, Jr., 
Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 558 (1st Cir. 1974) (standards 
setting did not restrain trade when few architects followed the standard).  
137 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 
(1961). 
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art becomes unsalable without an authentication opinion.138  
Given the factual similarities between “seals of approval” and 
opinions about authenticity, plaintiffs like Simon-Whelan might 
consider the reasoning from Radiant Burners when challenging 
authentication decisions. This issue could also perhaps arise if auction 
houses and dealers refused to sell paintings without authentication 
from a particular board. 
 
C.  Liability Theories Challenging the Substantive Standard Itself 
 
In Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., the Supreme 
Court held that standards setting must be substantively and proce-
durally fair.139 Courts rarely analyze the substantive “reasonableness” 
of the standard itself on grounds they lack expertise to analyze the 
technical details. That said, if there is evidence that the standard is 
patently arbitrary, a court might reject the substantive standard itself 
as unreasonable.  
According to an FTC advisory opinion, standards should be kept 
current with new research and authentication based on rigid 
“pass/fail” processes should be avoided.140 In cases challenging a 
substantive standard, the burden of proof with respect to reasonable-
ness lies on those who develop and enforce the standards.141 This 
suggests there is a significant liability exposure for authentication 
boards employing secretive methods or methods based on subjective 
knowledge rather than a consistent industry standard. Radiant 
Burners, for example, struck down a certification test for lack of 
“objective standards” because the standards had a potential to be 
arbitrary and capricious.142  
                                                                                                             
138 See Brookins v. Int’l Motor Contest Ass’n., 219 F.3d 849, 853-54 (8th Cir. 
2000); Kramer, 890 F. Supp. at 256. 
139 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 509 
(1988) (holding legality of standards-setting conduct under antitrust law “depends 
upon the existence of safeguards sufficient to prevent the standard-setting process 
from being biased by members with economic interests in restraining compe-
tition.”). 
140 FTC Advisory Opinion No. 457, 78 F.T.C. 1628, 1971 WL 128741 (Mar. 8, 
1971). 
141 Id. 
142 Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. at 658. 
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There must be a basis for determining whether a product complies 
with the standard. A standards setting organization might even be 
forced to alter its standard if there is no reasonable justification for 
excluding new products from the standard.143 For example, Wilk v. 
American Medical Association struck down American Medical 
Association standards denying chiropractors access to health facilities 
because plaintiffs provided detailed information about the medical 
benefits of chiropractic treatments.144 Those seeking authentication 
should also marshal all relevant extrinsic evidence showing their 
artwork is authentic. 
 
D.  Liability Based on Procedural Defects in the Authentication 
Process 
 
As collectors, boards, and courts grapple with antitrust litigation 
over art authenticity, laws governing certification and standards 
setting could provide guidance for evaluating the procedural aspects 
of art authentication practices.145 If there is evidence that standard 
setting or authentication was improperly manipulated to gain a 
competitive advantage, this could raise antitrust concerns.146  
Radiant Burners held standards and certification should be 
evaluated by looking at the intent of those setting them and whether 
the defendants have anticompetitive incentives.147 Evidence that 
authentication practices were applied arbitrarily in the past would 
also help the plaintiff.148 Courts might examine the composition of a 
                                                                                                             
143 Am. Soc’y of Sanitary Eng’g, 106 F.T.C. 324, 329 (1985), 1985 WL 
668922.  
144 719 F.2d 207, 213-217 (7th Cir. 1983). 
145 There is precedent for examining certification, standards setting, and 
authentication under the same lens. For example, the Indian Arts and Crafts Board 
within the U.S. Department of the Interior assists with registering certification 
marks to ensure Native American art is genuine. 25 U.S.C. § 305a (2006).  
146 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988); 
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); 
Hydrolevel Corp. v. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. 635 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1980), 
aff’d 456 U.S. 556 (1982); Jessup v. Am. Kennel Club, 61 F. Supp. 2d 5 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999); Carleton v. Vermont Dairy Herd Improvement Ass’n., 782 F. Supp. 926, 
934 (D. Vt. 1991).  
147 Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. 656.  
148 See Hatley v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass’n, 552 F.2d 646, 653-54 (5th Cir. 
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Board to identify procedural irregularities or possible conflicts of 
interest.149  
In response to an FTC advisory opinion regarding antitrust 
liability for certification, ANSI promulgated due process guidelines 
to ensure decisions are based on objective judgments rather than 
economic self-interest.150 These guidelines are consistent with emer-
ging practices in the art world. For example, College Art Association 
authentication guidelines prohibit certifying bodies from offering 
self-interested opinions.151  
The U.S. Department of Justice has also affirmed that certifica-
tion bodies should award seals of approval on non-discriminatory 
bases.152 In short, numerous standards and certification guidelines 
make clear there is a duty to administer authentication fairly and 
without hindering competition: 
[T]he objective character of a seal, and a reputation 
for reliability, give rise to an obligation to administer 
the seal with the utmost fairness and to make it avail-
able to everyone who can meet the tests. This follows 
from the fact that when a seal has such prestige it can 
mean the difference between success and failure to a 
                                                                                                             
1977) (rejecting a challenge to a decision not to register a horse as a quarter horse 
because the standards “were not applied in a discriminatory, arbitrary, or capricious 
fashion”).  
149 Cf. Pretz v. Holstein Friesian Ass’n, 698 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (D. Kan. 
1988) (holding cattle-breeding association liable for denying certification of 
plaintiff’s cattle for failing milk content test because cattle became worthless 
without certification).  
150 See, e.g., ANSI Essential Requirements: Due process requirements for 
American National Standards, AM. NAT. STANDARDS INST. (Jan. 5, 2010, 8:10 
AM), http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/default.aspx (follow “American National 
Standards” hyperlink; then follow “Procedures, Guides, and Forms” hyperlink; then 
follow “2010 ANSI Essential Requirements” hyperlink; then follow “2010 ANSI 
Essential Requirements” hyperlink). 
151 Compare FTC Advisory Opinion No. 457, 78 F.T.C. 1628, ¶ 16, 1971 WL 
128741 (1971) with Standards and Guidelines: Authentications and Attributions, 
COLLEGE ART ASS’N (Oct. 25, 2009), http://www.collegeart.org/guidelines/ authen 
tications. 
152 Joel E. Hoffman, Industry-Wide Codes, Advertising, Seals of Approval and 
Standards: As Participated in by the Trade Association, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 595 
(1968).  
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business.153 
Authentication committees should therefore consider less restrictive 
alternatives to stamping “DENIED” on rejected artwork.154 Alter-
natives could include refusing to provide a letter of authentication or 
publishing a denial decision in the artist’s catalogue raisonné. 
In the 1970s, the International Foundation for Art Research 
(IFAR) was formed as an independent art accreditation service after 
New York Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz raised concerns 
about the growing risk of forgeries flooding the art market.155 
Although organizations like IFAR had fewer conflicts of interest, 
there were still concerns about transparency because “[authentication 
committees] possess[] the aura of impartiality and scholarship . . . 
[but their] internal procedures are secret . . .”156 Some art pro-
fessionals responded to these concerns by adopting codes of ethics or 
best practices guidelines.  
Most museums, for example, prohibit curators from consulting on 
third-party works.157 The Art Dealers Association of America also 
adopted an ethical code.158 The College Art Association of America 
issued authentication guidelines that require “[a]rt-historical docu-
mentation, stylistic connoisseurship, and technical or scientific 
                                                                                                             
153 Robert B. Hummel, Antitrust Problems of Industry Codes of Advertising, 
Standardization, and Seals of Approval, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 607 (1968) 
(emphasis added).  
154 See supra note 104. On the other hand, such practices would likely be 
upheld under a rule of reason analysis if there were a rational basis for taking those 
steps. Given that Warhol art is, quite literally, a product of mass reproduction 
through near-identical series, there is a potentially high risk of Warhol forgeries 
entering the market. Nevertheless, connoisseurship or scientific authentication 
could provide less restrictive alternatives of weeding out fakes. 
155 Leonard D. DuBoff, Controlling the Artful Con: Authentication and 
Regulation, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 973, 1020 (1976) (citing Arnason, Introducing the 
International Foundation for Art Research, MUSEUM NEWS, Apr. 1972, at 28). See 
generally, INT’L FOUND. FOR ART RESEARCH, http://www.ifar.org/authentication 
.php (last visited Apr. 4, 2010). 
156 DuBoff, supra note 155, at 1019-20. 
157 ELAINE A. KING & GAIL LEVIN, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 257 (2006). 
158 See generally, Professional Guidelines, INT’L. FOUND. FOR ART RESEARCH, 
http://www.ifar.org/professional_guidelines.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2011); 
LEONARD D. DUBOFF & CHRISTY O. KING, ART LAW IN A NUTSHELL 85 (3d ed. 
2000). 
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analysis . . .”159 Despite such efforts, many authentication boards 
continue to conduct their work in secret.160 This strategy could be 
harmful in defending against antitrust lawsuits because clear proce-
dural safeguards in the standards development and authentication 
process can tip the rule of reason analysis in the defendant’s favor.161 
In summary, antitrust issues arising from non-art certification and 
standards setting could offer additional legal theories for litigants 
challenging art authentication decisions by suggesting procedural 
protections the authentication boards should provide. At the same 
time, adopting formal procedures for authentication shields authen-
tication boards that consistently follow the procedures. Committees 
should not attempt to enforce their standards by punishing market 
actors that deviate.162 Instead, the authentication process should 
include clear criteria, appeal processes, and a mechanism for 




Simon-Whelan potentially increases the liability of art profes-
sionals who pass judgment on the authenticity of artwork.163 Tort 
litigation has already shuttered many authentication bodies in the 
past.164 After Simon-Whelan, antitrust liability has the potential to 
                                                                                                             
159 Standards and Guidelines: Authentications and Attributions, COLLEGE ART 
ASS’N (Oct. 25, 2009), http://www.collegeart.org/guidelines/authentications. 
160 Kai B. Singer, ‘Sotheby's Sold Me a Fake!’—Holding Auction Houses 
Accountable for Authenticating and Attributing Works of Fine Art, 23 COLUM. J.L. 
& ARTS 439, 449 (1999-2000); See Steven M. Levy, Liability of the Art Expert for 
Professional Malpractice, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 595, 596 (1991) 
161 Committees that insist on secret authentication practices should consider 
carrying an Errors and Omissions insurance policy. CRSA Guidelines for Issuing 
Scholarly Opinions about Authenticity, CATALOGUE RAISONNÉ SCHOLARS ASS’N 
(Apr. 2010), http://www.catalogueraisonne.org/CRSAGuidelines.pdf.  
162 See, e.g., Santana Prods., Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 401 F.3d 
123, 132-33 (3d Cir. 2005) (no antitrust violation when trade association criticized 
plaintiff’s products, but did not coerce market actors). 
163 Sharon Flescher & Mary Morabito Rosewater, Dispute Against the Warhol 
Authentication Board Allowed to Proceed, 11 IFAR J. 36 (2009), http://www. 
ifar.org/publication_detail.php?docid=1251923912.  
164 The Pollock-Krasner Authentication Board, for example, shut down after 
fighting numerous legal battles with disappointed collectors. McCloud v. Lawrence 
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make this line of work even more risky. As this new legal theory 
emerges, the law of antitrust governing certification and standards 
setting could both strengthen causes of action against art authen-
tication bodies and suggest best practices to reduce liability. 
Authentication bodies should therefore respond by carefully evalu-
ating the current practices and protections offered by certification and 




 A denial of authenticity that prohibits a collector from selling his 
or her painting can constitute a sufficient antitrust injury under 
the Sherman Antitrust Act, but factual allegations in a complaint 
must be sufficiently specific to justify dragging a defendant 
through discovery. Plaintiffs should review the factors outlined in 
Simon-Whelan and Thome to ensure pleadings contain a plausible 
claim for antitrust relief under Twombly. 
 Famous paintings, such as works by Jackson Pollock or Andy 
Warhol, might constitute a relevant submarket for purposes of 
antitrust pleading. But the exact contours of a submarket for 
Warhol artwork remains unclear and may overlook the possibility 
that other contemporary artwork could be economic substitutes 
for Warhols. 
 Antitrust law has a rich body of precedent dealing with standards 
setting and certification that could also apply to art authentication. 
Those laws suggest there is a duty to administer authentication 
fairly and without hindering competition. 
 Art authentication is likely subject to “rule of reason” antitrust 
analysis and therefore lawful unless the anticompetitive effects of 
the authentication process outweigh the procompetitive benefits. 
While courts usually will not analyze the substantive reason-
ableness of a standard itself, a court might reject a substantive 
standard if there is evidence it is patently arbitrary. 
                                                                                                             
Gallery, Ltd., No. 90 Civ. 30(KMW), 1991 WL 136027 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1991); 
Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Found., 890 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Lariviere v. 
Thaw, 2000 NY Slip Op. 50000(U), 2000 WL 33965732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 26, 
2000).  
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 Organizations authenticating artwork should avoid conflicts of 
interest—or perceived conflicts of interest—by ensuring no one 
involved in authentication sells potentially competing artwork. 
Procedural due process protections should be transparent and 
organizations should conduct periodic reviews to ensure internal 
compliance. 
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